Germany's preferences on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement: the Wirtschaftswunder and opportunity and effort of Turkish diplomacy by Mayer, Matthias M.
Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
  1 
GERMANY’S PREFERENCES ON THE FREEDOM OF 
MOVEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE ANKARA AGREEMENT: THE 
WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER AND OPPORTUNITY AND EFFORTS 
OF TURKISH DIPLOMACY 
 
European Union Studies Association, 11th Biennial International Conference 
Marina Del Rey, California, April 23rd - 25th, 2009 
 
Matthias M. Mayer
1 
 
Draft: Please do not cite without permission of the author. 
Abstract 
Why did Germany support provisions on freedom of movement for Turkish workers in the Association 
Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, which was concluded in 
1963? This is puzzling given that Germany was fervently opposed to other common EU measures on 
legal economic migration since immigration policy was communitarized by the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999. The papers test two hypotheses. First, that the a positive economic situation induces the 
German government to support common EU measures as in periods of strong growth Germany has 
more open immigration policies and there is a positive relationship between open national immigration 
policies and support for common EU measures. Second, a sending country (or a group of sending 
countries) needs to exert diplomatic pressure on the German government in order for it to support 
common EU measures on legal economic migration. For this to be successful there need to be two 
conditions in place, the sending country must have the opportunity to exert influence, due to strong 
historical ties with Germany or being important for geo-political reasons, and frame the need for 
common EU measures on legal migration in an effective manner. The hypotheses are confirmed for 
the case of Turkey and the Ankara Agreement and are used to assemble a theoretically eclectic and 
generally applicable framework able to explain Germany’s support for common EU measures on legal 
economic migration. 
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Introduction 
On 12 September 1963, the European Economic Community concluded an association agreement 
with Turkey (Ankara Agreement). The Agreement entered into force 1 December 1964. It was 
supposed to establish a customs union between the two parties in three steps and possibly to prepare 
Turkey for EEC membership. The Agreement contained provisions on the establishment of the 
freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and the EEC and thus constituted the first instance 
when  EEC  Member  States  agreed  on  common  European  policy  measures  on  legal  economic 
migration. 
 
This is puzzling for a number of reasons. EEC Member States could agree on common European 
action for provisions on freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey. However, around 40 
years later, efforts to create common EU measures on legal economic migration from outside the 
Union into the Union failed because pronounced opposition and disagreement about the nature of 
such measures,
2 and Germany had become to be one of the fiercest opponents of common EU 
measures on economic migration. Moreover, the federal government of Germany concluded a bilateral 
labour recruitment with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur “Regelung der Vermittlung 
türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“), before the Association Agreement 
with Turkey was brought to a successful conclusion. These developments pose an array of important 
questions. First, why did the federal government of Germany see the need for EEC involvement in this 
domain when everything was already regulated on the bilateral level? Second, why did the EEC only 
put in place provisions on freedom of movement with Turkey (and Greece) and not with other 
countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which have been used as a source 
of labour migrants by EEC Member States? Third, why do the freedom of movement provisions feature 
at all in an agreement which had the establishment of a custom union as its main objective? Finally, 
was the commitment for establishing the freedom of movement provisions lacking from the very 
beginning, thus leaving ultimate power to implement the freedom of movement provision to the 
                                                
2 Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and 
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Association Council, where every Member State has the right to veto? While all these questions need 
to be – and will be - answered, the main and overarching question that concerns this paper is: why did 
Germany support the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement? 
 
The paper focuses on the period between the points in time when Turkey applied for European 
Economic Community (EEC) associate membership in 1959 and the Ankara Agreement entered into 
force in 1964. The analysis is concerned with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), i.e. what was 
then West Germany.
3 The argument of the paper is based on two hypotheses. The first one relates to 
the importance of a healthy economy in mobilising German support for the freedom of movement 
provisions of the Ankara Agreement. The second hypothesis is based on the importance of the 
sending country Turkey in influencing Germany to support the provisions. Hypothesis two consists of 
two parts, the opportunity of Turkey to wield some power to push for its goals, and the utilisation of that 
power by effective diplomatic efforts. The paper thus presents a more nuanced analysis to explain 
Germany’s support for the freedom of movement provisions than existing treatments of the topic. The 
paper uses archival primary data from three different archives which has been looked through for the 
first time with a particular focus on the freedom of movement provisions.
4 Most of the materials are 
governmental documents that are now accessible. While, by and large, they are  well archived 
sometimes the context in which they are written is not clearly established. Secondary literature plus 
two interviews with experts in the field are used to triangulate the information obtained in the archives.
5 
The paper is structured as follows. It begins with a brief overview of the Ankara Agreement, its freedom 
of  movement  provisions  and  an  outline  of  Germany’s  preferences  on  the  Agreement  and  the 
provisions. This is followed by a conceptual section that derives two multi-layered hypotheses to 
explain Germany’s preferences. The paper then moves on to the empirical analysis that puts the two 
hypotheses to the test. The paper ends with a concluding section. 
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Articles of the Agreement contain the most far-reaching provisions with regard to the freedom of movement for Turkish 
workers. Although its implementation is not tied to a particular deadline, Article 12 contains a binding obligation for Member 
States to establish the freedom of movement. 
4 The German Federal Archiv (Bundesarchiv) in Koblenz, the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, and the 
Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) 
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I. The Ankara Agreement and Germany’s preferences on the freedom of 
movement provisions 
Background 
The first steps towards the association agreement were undertaken by Turkey and not the EEC. 
Accordingly, Turkey applied to be an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
on 31 July 1959. This was shortly after Greece put forward its application. An association agreement 
between the Republic of Turkey and the EEC (Ankara Agreement) was signed on 12 September 1963 
and entered into force on 1 December 1964 (Bridge 1976: 161). The association agreement between 
Greece and the EEC was concluded two years earlier on 9 July 1961, after negotiations that were less 
lengthy than the ones on the Ankara Agreement. The former entered into force November 1962 (Rey 
1963: 54; Wülker 1971: 63; Önis 2001: 108). The Ankara agreement was concluded to make Turkey 
an associate member of the EEC, to establish a customs union and to possibly pave the way for a 
Turkish membership to the EEC (Deutscher Bundestag 1964b; Joseph 2006: 3).
6 
 
Free movement of workers (Articles 12, 13 and 14) 
Article 12: 
The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty establishing the 
Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers between them. 
 
Article 13: 
The  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  be  guided  by  Articles  52  to  56  and  Article  58  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment 
between them. 
 
Article 14: 
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The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 55, 56 and 58 to 65 of the Treaty establishing 
the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom to provide services between 
them. 
 
Article 12, 13 and 14 of the Agreement comprise provisions of economic migration, i.e. the freedom of 
movement of workers. Ceylanoglu (2004: 18) suggests that these provisions were taken from the 
Treaty  of  Rome  which  together  with  its  four freedoms
7  served  as  a model  for  the  association 
agreement and that there was no disagreement about the freedom of movement provisions in the 
negotiations.
8 The paper shows that this is only partially true, as there was some disagreement and the 
wording and content of the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement differs from both 
the Treaty of Rome and the Association Agreement with Greece. 
 
Article 12 refers to the establishment of the freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey. This 
provision is based on Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty.
9 Article 13 is to establish the 
abolishment of restrictions on the freedom of establishment between the EEC and Turkey. It is based 
on Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the EEC Treaty.
10 Article 14 obligates the contracting parties to do 
away with any restrictions on freedom to provide services between them (Council of the European 
Union 1992). The Agreement also contains a number of further economic provisions for economic 
union regarding for instance, transport, competition, taxation, balance of payment, movement of 
capital. The Articles, including the ones on the freedom of movement, are only brief and rather vague 
in their wording. They are supposed to be supplemented with additional protocols by the end of the 
preparatory stage (Wülker 1971: 65). Article 36 of the Additional Protocol provides for the gradual 
establishment of free movement by 1986, with the process managed by the Association Council (Ugur 
1999: 143). As Member States do have veto points in the Council, freedom of movement was never 
established. 
 
                                                
7 The four freedoms include the freedom to move (I) people, (II) goods, (III) services and (IV) money freely around the 
EEC (and later the EU). 
8 Supplemented by personal communication with author, 28 April 2008. 
9 Articles 48-50 of the EEC Treaty lay down the provisions on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
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Preferences of the federal government of Germany 
The German government supported including provisions on the freedom of movement and the right of 
establishment, and the freedom to provide services, in the Ankara Agreement. In the course of the pre-
negotiation  talks,  Germany  lobbied  for  the  inclusion  of  these  provisions  in  the  Agreement 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963a). The only condition was that these provisions should apply 
to both EEC and Turkish nationals (Council of the European Economic Community 1959a). Officially, 
the Ankara Agreement was supposed to lead to eventual EU membership. Hence, the German 
government thought the Agreement should be modelled as closely as possible to the Treaty of Rome, 
including its provisions on freedom of movement, right of establishment, and the provision of services. 
The next section will explore what the existing literature can contribute theoretically to answer the 
question why Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement and 
distil two hypotheses. 
 
II. Conceptual framework 
The Ankara Agreement has been researched by scholars from different disciplines, including, law, 
history, economics and political science. However, the political dynamics, in particular with regard to 
the provisions on the freedom of movement for workers have not been explored in detail. Thus the 
paper  filters  relevant  propositions  of  existing  works  and  uses  them  to  assemble  an  analytical 
framework consisting of two multi-dimensional hypotheses which will then be used to explore the 
empirical jungle of mountains of archival material to extract the causal mechanisms that led the 
particular position of the federal government of Germany. Theoretically, the paper is on the nexus 
between European integration and immigration policy making. Hence, both streams of literature have 
to been consulted. 
 
Hypothesis One: Economic Situation in Germany 
 
a)  Strong economic growth in Germany makes it easier for the government to support common EU 
measures on legal economic migration. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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b)  In periods of strong economic growth Germany has more open immigration policies. 
c)  There  is  a  positive  relationship  between  more  open  national  immigration  policies  and  the 
willingness to agree to common policy measures on the EU level. 
 
Economic considerations play an important role in the formulation of immigration policies. Economic 
prosperity instigates states to accept more immigrants. Conversely, during recessions states are more 
reluctant to admit migrants which can damage bilateral ties between sending and receiving countries 
(Miller 2000: 36). Meyers (2004: 12) suggests that the economic situation impacts immigration policy 
through the interest group channel, and, mostly in times of economic crisis, also through the partisan 
channel. During periods of strong economic growth, employers are eager to hire additional workers 
and they employ their resources to lobby for liberal immigration policies. Domestic workers are happy 
over immigration inflows as long as they take low-paid jobs, allowing the domestic workers to improve 
their social position (Meyers 2004: 12). This can be underpinned by a liberal economic model: 
continued supply of labour keeps firms’ wage bills low and profits up, hence making sure there is a 
favourable climate for investment, improved productivity, low inflation, and increased consumption. 
This model predicts – rather optimistically – strong economic growth and increasing wages as long as 
labour supplies are unlimited and demand is increasing (Lewis 1954; Kindleberger 1967; Hollifield 
1992: 104). In times of recession, the model breaks down because of decreasing demand and the 
augmented importance of political reasons, first because of realist considerations that immigration is 
no longer necessary to sustain economic growth and second due to domestic interest group and 
partisan politics pulling the government towards a more nationalist stance (Hollifield 1992: 109). 
 
Hypothesis Two: Pressure of Third Country 
a)  A country that has to opportunity to influence the German position on immigration policies if 
i)  the geopolitical security situation makes it an important partner for Germany. 
ii)  it has strong historical ties with Germany. 
b)  A country that makes use of this opportunity by cleverly farming the issues at stake and exerting 
effective diplomatic pressure has a significant impact on the German government’s position on a 
particular migration issue. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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Third countries or sending countries can have an impact on immigration policies of receiving countries. 
However, such considerations do not feature very prominently in the literature on national immigration 
outcomes. Emigration countries generally advocate open policies because of the prospects of curbing 
illegal migration and securing the sending of remittances (Miller 2000: 36). For sending countries to 
have an influence on receiving countries’ preferences, policies, or agreements, two conditions need to 
be in place. First, they need to have the opportunity and second they need to make use of the 
opportunity, i.e. frame a particular policy issues in a way that allows them to influence immigration 
policies of receiving countries. Lavenex (2001: 25) defines policy frames as “the ideational core of a 
particular policy field, which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social problem and 
expresses guideposts for action.” Once created, policy frames structure actors’ perceptions and 
interpretations and influence the political decision-making process.  
 
First, the opportunity of a sending country (or a group of sending countries) to influence the German 
government’s preferences on immigration policies can be a result of the general geo-political security 
situation. The link between immigration policy and security or military motivated consideration has 
been used in the literature to explain national immigration policies. This is in accord with realist (see, 
for  instance,    Morgenthau  1978)  and  neo-realist  writings  (see,  for  instance,  Waltz  1979)  on 
International Relations, putting forward a simplified model of the state as a unitary actor behaving 
rationally in the pursuit of maximising its power and attributing the highest importance to security 
issues on the foreign policy agenda (Meyers 2000: 1263; Hollifield 2004a).
11 While realist approaches 
are seen has only having a marginal value in explaining international migration polices apart from 
refugee polices (Meyers 2000: 1265), this paper argues that security political considerations play an 
important role in explaining why Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the 
Ankara Agreement. Rudolph offers a theoretical model explaining different outcomes of migration 
policy by the primary independent variable “structural threat environment” (Rudolph 2006: 29-40). The 
author puts forward that immigration policies that served foreign policy and economic interests enabled 
                                                
11 For a discussion of the problems of realism and neo-realism see: Allison, G. T. (1999). Essence of decision: explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers. For a discussion of International Relations theory in light of 
international migration see: Rudolph, C. (2006). National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States 
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decision-makers in Germany to successfully fight the Communist threat during the beginning of the 
Cold War, i.e. accepting foreign workers kept the German economy growing and healthy to prevent 
potential Soviet expansion (Rudolph 2006: 102). Other scholars argue that countries are generally 
willing to accept immigrants from particular countries for the sake of foreign policy goals, such as 
fostering relations with allies or sustaining political links that have been established in the past (Meyers 
2004: 15). The US, for instance, has employed immigration policy as a tool to achieve certain foreign 
policy objectives. Generally this took place in revising restrictive national immigration laws in order not 
to endanger deterioration or to improve relations with a country of particular foreign policy interest. 
Examples are the annulling of immigration laws excluding Chinese workers to move to the US, after 
the US had an interest in fostering friendly relations with an ally during the Second World War in 1943, 
and the favourable treatment of the Western World in maintaining “good neighbour” relations (Díaz-
Briquets 1995: 161; Stanton Russel 1995: 61-70; Zolberg 1995: 120-121). The 1968 recruitment treaty 
between Germany and Yugoslavia is also attributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations as part of 
the beginning Ostpolitik (Thränhardt 1996; Meyers 2004: 165). Also the recruitment quota that the 
German  government  attributed  to  Tunisia  is  said  to  have  served  foreign  policy  considerations 
(Schönwälder 2004: 254). The paper argues that in order for security concerns to influence a receiving 
country’s immigration policies, diplomatic pressures of the sending country (or a number of sending 
countries) need to be exerted.
12 
 
Second, countries that have the opportunity to have an impact on a particular sending country tend to 
be countries with special ties to that country. Generally, post-colonies of European countries are given 
as examples. For instance during the period of decolonialisation after World War II, Algerians were 
considered French, Caribbean and Indian migrants were subjects of the British crown and later British 
citizens, and Molukkans were Dutch citizens (Thränhardt 1992: 21-23; Cornelius, Martin et al. 1994: 
15-22; Joppke 2005: 95-96). Although treatment of nationals from those countries was far from perfect 
and also at times was strained by the shadows of colonial history, such as entrenched social, 
                                                
12 The importance of foreign policy factors has been analysed also in the context of EU immigration policies and have been 
argued to be an important factor for formulating such policies. Gatev (2008), for instance, shows that the EU cooperates with 
third-countries on a wide range of possible immigration measures – be it accepting migrants to EU territory or borderline 
cooperation – in order to achieve a different set of immigration unrelated foreign policy considerations, such as energy 
security or knowledge of a strategically important region on the frontier between East and West. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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economic, and racial hierarchy, it was much easier for them to be accepted as a migrant in their 
respective former colonial power (Chin 2007: 27). With regard to Germany, historical links (together 
with  foreign  policy  relations)  to  Yugoslavia  contributed  to  conclusion  of  the  labour  recruitment 
agreements (Meyers 2004: 165). Also, the fact that the idea of foreign labour recruitment entered 
German economic discourse in late 1952 is partly due to Italian requests to Germany policy makers to 
accept seasonal workers from Italy (Rudolph 2006: 2006). That Tunisia was granted an immigration 
quota to Germany in 1965 was chiefly due to Tunisia’s president Bourgiba reminding the German 
government of Tunisia’s support when other Arab countries turned their back to West Germany due to 
weapon deliveries to Israel (Schönwälder 2004: 254). 
 
Sending countries’ decision to influence a receiving country, such as Germany, can be motivated by a 
number of factors, most notably, developmental economic benefits, geopolitical security benefits, and 
historical rivalries with neighbouring countries. Regarding economic benefits, prospects of remittances, 
easing the tense domestic labour market situation, and transferring skills from the receiving to the 
sending country are important considerations. Poland’s efforts to conclude agreements with Western 
European countries that would enable Polish workers to attain employment abroad, for instance, was 
part of a conscious emigration policy aimed at easing the country’s difficult economic situation resulting 
from the transition to a market economy (Kicinger 2009: 90). This was the only way to decrease 
unemployment (Zientara 2008: 422). Similar developments can also be observed for other cases, such 
as Mexico (Fitzgerald 2006). Thus, the gist of hypothesis two is, that by making use of the traditionally 
cordial relationship between the two countries while framing the Soviet threat as a significant danger to 
Turkey, and articulating this vis-à-vis the German government in an effective way and according to its 
interests, the Turkish government influenced the position of the German government it is favour. 
 
III. Explaining Germany’s preferences on the freedom of movement 
provisions 
The empirical analysis tests the two hypotheses developed in the preceding section. Germany’s 
preferences were formulated  by the government and  relevant ministries (Haftendorn  1983: 51; Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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Ceylanoglu 2004: 21). At the time when the Ankara Agreement was debated, European Integration 
was a process that happened almost unnoticed by the general public (Görtenaker 2002: 145-146). 
There  was very little newspaper coverage on the Ankara Agreement, not even to mention the 
provisions on the freedom of movement. Hence, public opinion and the media did not play an 
important role in the preference formation on the Ankara Agreement and the freedom of movement 
provisions. Neither is there any indication that the employer associations held active positions with 
regard to the Agreement. Also the Länder governments were not involved in the preference formation 
of the German government. Even if they had been, they probably would have been in-line with the 
federal government as it did not face any significant opposition in the Bundesrat between 1959 and 
1964.
13 The position of the German government concerning associating Turkey with the EEC has been 
shared in trade union circles (cf. Donner 1959; Schröder-Brzosniowsky 1959; Donner 1961; Donner 
1963).
14 However, there are no separate statements on the provision on freedom of movement, right of 
establishment, and the provisions of services. 
 
However, interest groups or private actors came in through “the back door” as they contributed their 
part in making the German government to sign the bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey which 
in  turn  had  an  important  impact  on  the  German  government’s  preferences  on  the  freedom  of 
movement provisions. This will be analysed in detail in section III. Competency on formulating the 
preferences on the Ankara Agreement was largely a bureaucratic matter and happened between the 
relevant German Ministries. As the EEC was still in its infancy, competences on formulating Germany’s 
position on European integration were not yet clear cut. Both the Foreign Office and the Federal 
Ministry of Economics shared responsibility on European Integration and thus also with regard to the 
Association Agreements. The Foreign Office was masterminding the general process with the Ministry 
of Economics having the final say on economic matters. In practice, general and economic matters 
were sometimes difficult to disentangle which produced fertile ground for competency struggles 
between the two ministries (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959a). Thus Germany’s preferences on 
                                                
13 The Bundesrat is the upper house of the German parliament and represents the Länder. 
14 In the Journal Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, which is supposed to be the theoretical centre for debate in the German 
trade unions, it has been repeatedly argued that concluding an association agreement with Turkey would be beneficial for the 
EEC on political and economic grounds. Nonetheless, the problems an association agreement with Turkey posed were also 
discussed. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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the Ankara Agreement were by and large formulated between the Foreign Office and the Federal 
Ministry of Economics, with other Ministries, such as Justice, Employment and Social Affairs, and 
Interior only playing a marginal role. With regard to macro decisions, the final say was with Chancellor 
Adenauer (cf.: Müller-Rommel 1994: 162; Rudzio 2003: 289-290). 
 
Germany’s economic situation 
The first causal factor is the general economic situation Germany was in. It was very positive and 
made the government confident to agree to provisions of freedom of movement with Turkey, even 
though they were not directly needed to fill Germany’s labour shortages. Thus, in line with hypothesis 
one, Germany’s healthy economic situation was a necessary condition for its support for the freedom 
of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. 
 
Figure 1 indicates the healthy shape of the German economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Figure 
2 shows the number of employees in Germany that were foreign nationals. There is a sharp increase 
in foreign nationals working in Germany from 1959. In addition to the strong economic expansion, the 
age structure of the German population, the built-up of the Bundeswehr, the prolonged schooling time 
and the cut-off of the migration flow from Eastern Germany due to the erecting of the Berlin wall in 
1961 increased the demand for foreign workers in Germany (Schönwälder 2001: 159). The decrease 
in German labour force is illustrated by Figure 4. The figure also demonstrates that the overall labour 
force is slightly increasing up until 1965, due to labour immigration. This is made even clearer when 
also taking into account Figure 5 that displays the increased labour migration to Germany. Figure 5 
also shows that the number of vacancies is more or less constant between 1960 and1965 – despite 
the grown overall work force, suggesting that new jobs kept being created. Figure 3 splits up the 
number of foreign workers according to nationality. It indicates a significant increase in Turkish workers 
once the bilateral recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey was put in place in 1961 (and 
when its revised version entered into force in 1964). 
 Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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The positive economic climate enabled Germany to give substantial financial assistance for Turkey 
within the framework of the Association Agreement. Germany could afford to make sure that the 
negotiations would not collapse or be postponed even longer due to the EEC’s unwillingness to 
provide support to the Turkish economy and without which no realistic plans for a customs union not 
even to mention EEC membership for Turkey could be made. For instance, Germany took the biggest 
share of the burden to provide financial assistance to Turkey. Of the 175 Mio US Dollar of pre-
association aid, Germany provided 58.5 Mio US Dollar (around one third) (Özren 1999: 244). 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate West Germany, 1959-1965 
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Figure 2: Foreign Workers in Germany (in thousands) 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
Figure 3: Foreign Workers in Germany, by country of origin (in thousands) 
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Figure 4: Labour Force in Germany (in thousands) 
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Source: Herbert (2001: 207) 
 
Figure 5: Foreign labour force and job vacancies in Germany (in thousands) 
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Germany was suffering labour shortages by the time the Ankara Agreement was negotiated and there 
was no sign that the situation would change in the near future (Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaft 
Zeitung 1959; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959e; Düsseldorfer Nachrichten 1961; Kölner Stadt 
Anzeiger 1963). That Germany actually needed foreign labour contributed to the fact that immigration 
was a topic that was not controversial in domestic politics and decisions could be taken within the 
government ministries, largely shielded from the general public. In addition, labour shortages were 
hampering economic growth and thus standards of living, so no major interest group, e.g. employer 
associations and unions, or party was opposed to labour migration to Germany (Chin 2007: 37-38). 
Furthermore, despite the high immigrant inflow during the 1950s and 60s, there was no significant 
opposition in the German public (Hollifield 1992; Brochmann 1996). The first scattered critical voices 
began to emerge in the mid-1960s in form of newspaper articles and references in parliamentary 
debates (Schönwälder 2001: 179-1982). The importance of the economy and hence support for 
hypothesis one is also provided by the fact that recruitment of foreign labour to Germany decreased 
temporarily during the recession between 1966 and 1967 and came to an standstill – with the 
exception of family reunification, asylum, and migration of the highly skilled – after the first oil shock hit 
the German economy in 1973 (Geddes 2000: 2; Geddes 2003:81-82). Thus hypothesis one can be 
confirmed. 
Opportunity and Framing 
The second hypothesis consists of two different parts. First, Turkey was given the opportunity to 
influence Germany by the particular security situation of the cold war and the good state of its 
historically devolved relationship with Germany. Second, Turkey used this opportunity by lobbying 
Germany effectively to adopt a position favourable to Turkey. The following sections discuss each 
part of hypothesis two. 
 
Opportunity One: Cold War geopolitical security concerns 
The Cold War geopolitical security concerns contributed a great part to Turkey having the opportunity 
to influence the German position on the freedom of movement provisions. The rather general term 
“security concern” covers a couple factors. First, military security considerations related to the security Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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threat emanating from the Soviet Union, and second Germany’s limited foreign political room for 
manoeuvre due to its dependence on US military support. At the turn from the 1950s to the 1960s, the 
Cold War was raging. The Soviet Union with its expanding nuclear programme was perceived as a 
very important threat in the West. This was particularly the case for Western Germany, which was the 
epicentre of the Cold War and as a defeated power of World War II not in the possession of nuclear 
arms and in the position to defy the Soviet Union with its own military capacities. The threat of war was 
most immediate during the Berlin Crisis when the Soviet Union annulled the four power status of Berlin 
and which climaxed with the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 (Hacke 2003: 86-87). It was crucial for 
Germany to have very close ties with the Western powers and to intertwine as deeply and quickly as 
possible  with  the member  countries  of  organisations,  such  as  the  EEC  and  the  NATO.  Being 
integrated into the EEC gave Germany, which then still was a defeated nation without any foreign 
political influence, a voice on the European level (Lappenküper 1992: 89). Integrating with its Western 
European neighbours was then seen as the prime route to re-establish some of Germany’s geopolitical 
power. It also made Germany, at least de jure, an equal partner in the European project. German 
Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard mentioned the importance to find a quick solution for the Greek 
and Turkish bids in order not to upset the governments and publics of those two countries that 
constituted a cornerstones of NATO (Council of the European Economic Community 1959b). A 
German  aide-mémoire  indicates  the  importance  of  Turkey’s  geographic  location  and  military 
considerations for the conclusion of the Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963b). In a 
meeting held in the Council of the EEC at 3 April 1962, the German delegation reminded the other 
Member States that it is important not to offend Turkey for security political reasons (Ständige 
Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962). 
 
Germany was dependent on US goodwill and support in order to have a comfortable position in terms 
of geopolitical security and avoid the outbreak of a war on its territory. Germany was no nuclear power 
and needed support of the Western powers, in particular the US to deter the Soviet Union whose 
influence began immediately after the Federal Republic of Germany’s eastern borders (Adenauer 
1959-250;  Ständige  Vertretung  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  bei  der  Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962; Rudzio 2003: 17). This “fundamental dependence” (Johnson 1973: ix) Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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made Germany subordinate to the US and meant that German politicians had to take into account US 
interests when making foreign policy (Besson 1970: 185). Negotiations of the Ankara Agreement show 
that US pressure was an important factor in the EEC’s efforts to integrate Turkey into Europe. This is 
particularly the case for Germany (Commission of the European Economic Community 1963; Özren 
1999: 243; Krieger 2006: 189). The US also exercised diplomatic pressure in support of the Athens 
Agreement, including a visit to the Auswärtige Amt in 1960 (Ceylanoglu 2004: 217-218). The US 
influence impacted on Germany also through another channel, namely direct US diplomatic pressure 
with regard to the EEC association agreement with Greece. Head of the Unit dealing with European 
Affairs in the Federal Ministry of Economics, Mr. Jentsch, was called by the US embassy inquiring 
about the validity of rumours that Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, did not support the EEC 
Association Agreement with Greece (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959b). With regard to the 
Ankara Agreement, such a direct pressure cannot be found (Ceylanoglu 2004: 217-218). Nonetheless, 
the US was favourable towards Turkey becoming an associate member of the EEC. 
 
The containment policy of the US inaugurated by the Truman Doctrine in 1947 made it an important 
US foreign policy goal to support states endangered by Communism and Soviet rule, such as Turkey, 
and to anchor them in the West (Rudzio 2003: 14-15; Krieger 2006: 171-172). Turkey was particularly 
important as on 30 October 1959, it had agreed to station US missiles on its ground that could reach 
the Soviet Union. This made Turkey extremely important to the US, as only two further countries (the 
UK and Italy) had agreed to station such missiles on their ground (Jamin 1998: 70-71). Consequently, 
the US supported the Ankara Agreement, largely on political grounds (Ceylanoglu 2004: 213-218). The 
US was even prepared to put up with exposing its products, most notably tobacco, to increased 
competition with Turkish (and Greek) products within the EEC’s markets, in order to tie Turkey closer 
to the West (Council of the European Economic Community 1963). Regarding economic relations, 
increasing financial aid from the EEC to Turkey meant a relief for US finances (Gürbey 1990: 175; 
Özren 1999: 293; Krieger 2006: 37). In particular with regard to Germany and its increasing economic 
prosperity and capacity, the US expected a return service for the Marshall Plan (Krieger 2006: 178). In 
addition, the US held particularly close ties with Germany as preventing Germany to become a 
negative force in Europe again was the foundation of legitimacy for US hegemony in Europe (Krieger Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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2004: 182). The US supported closer and institutionalised ties between the EEC and Turkey also on 
budgetary  grounds.  Nonetheless,  it has to  be noted  that financial aid to Turkey  was politically 
motivated and sought to increase the West’s influence in the region. The US expected the German 
government to take “the leading role” in providing financial assistance to Turkey. The German 
government did not have much latitude in that respect and met the demands. Thus, Germany 
supported Turkey’s fast integration in the West by means of the Ankara Agreement. It sought to avoid 
any weakening of Turkey which was seen as an important pillar for the West and NATO partner vis-à-
vis the Soviet threat (Erhard 1959; Krieger 2006: 178). Generally, security political concerns, reflecting 
a logic of Realpolitik on the side of the German government, provide a convincing explanation for why 
Germany supported the Ankara Agreement as a whole. However, they do not give an indication of why 
the freedom of movement provisions feature in the Agreement. In order to explain this why need to 
include further causal factors in the analysis. 
 
Opportunity Two: close historical relationship 
The relationship between Germany and Turkey has been a special and cordial one, making the 
German administration rather receptive to Turkish demands. Germany was an important trade partner 
and ally for Turkey and in addition, the two countries were united by the long-established “German-
Turkish friendship” and the alliance in the First World War. Unlike a few years later, in the 1950s and 
early 1960s this “friendship” was still an appropriate characterisation of the German-Turkish relations 
(Gürbey 1990: 9-10). The German Foreign Office praised this alliance and friendship strongly in 1963 
and attributed great significance to it. Hunn describes the reciprocity of these appreciations with 
reference to archival material (Hunn 2005: 34-35).
15 A internal document of the Foreign Office 
indicates that the traditional bond with Turkey and the experience of Turkey as a reliable ally were still 
important considerations for Germany when the Ankara Agreement was discussed (Auswärtiges Amt 
1959). In July 1962, the Turkish government thanked the German government in a aide- mémoire for 
its continued support of the Turkish bid (Turkish Embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany 1962). 
This special relationship gave Turkey the opportunity to voice its interest to the German government 
with a good chance of being taken seriously. The active desire of Turkey to join the EEC, which 
                                                
15 Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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manifested itself for the first time in its application for EEC associate membership in 1959, built on this 
opportunity. 
 
Turkish Diplomatic Efforts 
The provisions of the freedom of movement for workers were important for Turkey. In the late 1950s, 
Turkey was in an economic and political crisis with inflation increasing by 60% between 1954 and 1958 
(Gitmez 1989: 4). The Turkish government anticipated that freedom of movement provisions promised 
several immediate benefits to Turkey that would change the status quo to the better (Escobar, 
Hailbronner et al. 2006: 716).
16 First, Turkey’s economy was suffering of sustained underemployment 
(Hunn 2005: 33). This was because its high birth rate, mechanisation of agriculture, and rapid 
industrialisation left many workers without a job. The possibility to export workers to the EEC promised 
relief  for  the  domestic  labour  market.  A  further  benefit  was  that  Turkish  workers  could  obtain 
professional qualifications in the EEC that would benefit Turkey’s economic development after return 
of the workers. Remittances from workers abroad could improve Turkey’s balance of payments 
(Wülker 1971: 69). Figure 6 indicates the increasing number of Turkish labour emigrants from 1961 to 
1973. Interestingly, the Turkish delegation initially was more interested in receiving qualified workers 
from the EEC to provide technical assistance rather than sending Turkish workers to the EEC 
(Commission of the European Economic Community 1959b; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959c; 
Council of the European Economic Community 1959c). In addition, the long-lasting rivalry with Greece 
which applied for EEC associate membership a few months before Turkey was important for Turkey’s 
motivations. This point will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 At the time when the freedom of movement provisions were negotiated, it was not clear that their date of implementation 
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Figure 6: Turkish workers sent abroad through the Turkish Employment Service
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Sources: Martin (1991: 22), Keyder and Aksu-Koç (1988: 17) 
 
It is argued here that Germany supported them to not endanger the conclusion of the Ankara 
Agreement. In order to advance its goals, Turkey used two framing devices, first the Soviet threat and 
second being disadvantaged vis-à-vis Greece. Thus Turkey wielded some political power to assert its 
demands vis-à-vis the Community and Germany because the German government saw Turkey as a 
very important partner for the EEC in terms of security. The Turks were careful to also frame the issue 
like that. For instance in April 1962, the Turkish Prime Minister, Đsmet Đnönü, stressed the fragility of its 
country despite it being an important pillar of NATO, and expressed his concern about the prolongation 
of the conclusion of the Agreement by the Community (Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962). On a more general note, in August 
1961, the Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Rauf Sarper conveyed a aide-mémoire to the German 
Embassy in Ankara expressing explicit Turkish expectations for German support of the Turkish bid for 
associate membership (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara 1961c). 
 
                                                
17 For the years 1961 and 1962, Keyder and Akso-Koç (1988) list different figures than the ones from the Turkish Employment 
service used by Martin (1991) for official workers sent abroad (4041 and 8620 respectively). The estimates of unofficial 
migration assume that unofficial emigration is 25% of official migration rounded to the nearest 100. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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However, most important is that Turkish motivations to join the EEC have to been seen in light of the 
developments that took place in the wake of Greece’s bid for EEC membership. Turkey did not want to 
fall behind its main rival Greece that had applied for EEC association membership in June 1959, two 
months before Turkey (Commission of the European Economic Community 1960b; Auswärtiges Amt 
1961a). Thus, the Turkish government used the necessity of equal treatment with Greece as a second 
framing device to make its case vis-à-vis the EEC. A letter about the German position sent within the 
German Ministry of Economics states that also the Commission saw the Turkish desire for equal 
treatment with Greece as the main reason for it attempts to conclude the Association Agreement with 
the EEC. The letter further argues that sensitivity of both the Greeks and the Turks as well as their 
mutual jealousy blocked the way to an Association Agreement with Turkey that differed fundamentally 
from the one with Greece. The letter further put forward that although an Agreement with Turkey that 
was completely identical to the one with Greece was not desirable due to Turkey’s lack of economic 
development, there was not much latitude to take this into account (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
1961). Also, a note on the federal government’s position with regard to the Association Agreement with 
Turkey shows that it was considered as politically impossible to refuse Turkey to become associate 
member of EEC such as for instance Greece (Council of the European Economic Community 1961). 
This argument is further corroborated by the fact that the Turkish delegation was at times badly 
prepared for the negotiations and predominantly tried to achieve the same provisions that have been 
agreed  in  the  Athens  Agreement  (Commission  of  the  European  Economic  Community  1959a; 
Commission of the European Economic Community 1960b). Turkey actively exerted pressure on 
Germany and the other EEC Member States, for instance orally by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin 
Rü tü Zorlu, also with reference to the importance of equal treatment with Greece (Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft 1960b). 
 
This Turkish behaviour induced by its relative position to Greece is also the key for the freedom of 
movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement. Before the Athens Agreement was concluded, Turkey 
did not have any particular demands with regard to freedom of movement, apart from technical 
assistance from the EEC (Council of the European Economic Community 1959d). At a later stage of 
the negotiations and after the Athens Agreement was successfully signed, the Turkish delegation’s Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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proposal on the content of the freedom of movement provisions consisted of a copy of the text of the 
relevant provisions of the Athens Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963c). It is important 
to note that Turkey made explicit demands for the freedom of movement provisions, i.e. they needed 
to be similar to the ones in the Athens Agreement. Ceylanoglu (2004: 18), for instance, misses this 
point. However, after Turkey articulated this demands, the Community did object to have the same 
provision  in  the  Ankara  Agreement  and  pushed  for  formulations  that  were  less  encompassing 
(Auswärtiges Amt 1963). Title III of the Ankara Agreement does not include articles on the exchange of 
young workers and the provision of technical assistance by the Community from the like of the ones in 
the Athens Agreement. In addition, the wording of the freedom of movement provisions in the Athens 
Agreement is stronger than in the Ankara Agreement. Thus, Title III of the Ankara Agreement was 
neither completely uncontested, nor is just a copy of Title III of the Athens Agreement. The next 
section discusses the bilateral labour recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey and its 
importance for Germany’s position on the freedom of movement provisions. 
 
Bilateral Agreement 
Germany and Turkey concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement on 30 October 1961 after 
around one year of exploratory talks and negotiations (Hunn 2005: 29). Figures 3 and 6 indicate the 
increase in the Turkish workforce in Germany after the agreement was concluded. This agreement 
was a necessary condition for German support of the freedom of movement provisions. When the 
Athens Agreement was negotiated, Germany agreed to support the freedom of movement provisions 
as it had concluded already a bilateral agreement with Greece in 1961 to recruit workers which was 
more concrete and comprehensive. Hence, German policy-makers were the opinion that the freedom 
of movement provisions of the Athens Agreement could well be included as they would not have any 
practical significance (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1960; Commission of the European Economic 
Community 1960a). Also with regard to Turkey, Germany was attributing greater importance to the 
bilateral agreement than to the regulations in the Association Agreement. As the federal government 
had already concluded a bilateral agreement with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur 
“Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“), it had no 
problems to support the provisions on the European level, as it thought that the actual regulation of the Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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movement of Turkish workers would be regulated by the bilateral agreement. The bilateral agreement 
had  entered  into  force  retroactively  on  1  September  1961  (Bundesminister  für  Arbeit  und 
Sozialordnung 1962; Hunn 2005: 46). It specified the selection procedure and a model work contract. 
The agreement was less generous than the ones with the other European countries, such as Italy, 
Spain, and Greece as it contained no provisions on family reunification and requesting specific Turkish 
workers by name. Moreover, it restricted the stay in Germany to two years (Bundesminister für Arbeit 
und Sozialordnung 1962; Steinert 1995: 308; Hunn 2005: 55-56).
18 This reflects that the German 
government was initially not very keen on concluding such an agreement with Turkey (Generalkonsulat 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Istanbul 1960). In September 1960, the Federal Agency for Labour 
and the Auswärtige Amt in November 1960 did not see any need to conclude a recruitment agreement 
with Turkey as the ones already in place would cover the German need for workers more than enough 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1960; Auswärtiges Amt 1960b; 
Hunn 2005: 46). 
 
The bilateral agreement – as the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement – can be 
explained by hypothesis one and two. The following section puts this claim to the test. In accordance 
with hypothesis one, the fast growing German post war economy with its hunger for foreign workers 
was a necessary condition for the German government to support the agreement. Also the run of 
Turkish workers interested in working in Germany to the German representations in Turkey was very 
high and contributed to German politicians recognising the necessity to conclude a bilateral agreement 
with  Turkey  (Botschaft  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  Ankara  1961a).  German  firms  were 
enthusiastic about employing Turkish workers and, in spring 1961, an increasing number of company 
and human resources directors undertook independent recruitment efforts in Turkey (Generalkonsulat 
der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  in  Istanbul  1961).  For  instance,  Tarik  Kadam,  a  Turkish  Civil 
Engineer working for Stuttgart-based construction company Karl Kübler, travelled to Istanbul to recruit 
in total 105 Turkish workers. In March 1961, The German general consulate in Istanbul had such a 
massive amount of recruitment demands by German firms that it decided to ask the Foreign Office for 
                                                
18 A revised version of the agreement came into force on 30 October 1964, which made its provisions very similar to the 
other bilateral labour recruitment agreements. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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advice. These developments contributed their share to the Federal Ministry for Labour deciding to be 
in  favour  of  meeting  Turkish  demands  to  produce  an  official  bilateral  agreement 
(Bundesarbeitsministerium) (Hunn 2005: 49). The Federal Ministry of the Interior was still reluctant to 
support a bilateral agreement. The Foreign Office proposed to send a recruitment commission to 
Turkey  that  together  with  the  Turkish  government  was  supposed  to  manage  German  labour 
recruitment. In July 1961, the ministries concluded that it was necessary to successfully negotiate an 
agreement. The Federal Ministry of the Interior managed to keep the final version of the agreement 
less generous than the agreements with Italy, Spain and Greece but could not avoid its conclusion as 
other influential ministries such as the Federal Ministry of Employment and the Foreign Office plus a 
number of important interest groups, such as the business lobby, favoured the agreement (Hunn 2005: 
52-59). Generally, the German immigration policy at that time was rather intransparent and was made 
shielded from the public (Schönwälder 2001: 197) 
 
As put forward by hypothesis two, it is important to note that the Turkish government had to exert 
serious diplomatic pressure in order to convince the German government to sign a bilateral recruitment 
agreement. The opportunity structure to influence the Germany position was the same as for the 
Ankara Agreement. Germany influenced the Germany government by framing the issue in a way that 
Germany might be in the process of offending an important NATO partner and with reference to the 
good relations it had with Germany (Steinert 1995: 306-307; Schönwälder 2001: 252). The Turkish 
embassy in Bonn conveyed a verbal note in which Turkey argues that as an important NATO partner, 
the Turkish government would need to see itself necessitated to regard a German “no” to the bilateral 
agreement as a dispraise vis-à-vis countries with similar geographic distance to Germany, such as 
Greece (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1960; Auswärtiges Amt 
1960a; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara 1961b). In addition, the Turkish government 
losened travel restrictions for Turkish nationals to make the case for a biltateral agreement due to the 
expected increase of labour migration from Turkey to Germany. The bilateral agreement put emigration 
of Turkish workers to Germany under governmental control which was an important consideration for 
the Turkish government (Keyder and Aksu-Koç 1988: 14). Other sources show that the Turkish 
government also made the case for the bilateral agreement on economic grounds (labour shortages in Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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Germany and abundance of workers in Turkey) (Turkish Embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany 
1960). 
 
The above arguments made it impossible for the German government to resist the bilateral agreement 
with Turkey (regarding the foreign policy argument, see, Steinert 1995: 307; Jamin 1998: 70-71; 
regarding migration control dimension, see, Schönwälder 2001: 252). The Auswärtige Amt was the first 
ministry to support the conclusion of a bilateral agreement because of the strong diplomatic pressure 
of Turkey (Hunn 2005: 48), and tried to persuade the still reluctant ministries, such as the Federal 
Ministry for the Interior, to do the same (Auswärtiges Amt 1961b). However, this resulted in some 
concession to the demands of the Federal Ministry of the Interior which meant that the bilateral 
agreement was less far-reaching than the ones with Italy, Spain and Greece. The position of the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) was that there should be no permanent 
employment for Turkish nationals in Germany and that there should be health checks, and strict 
control over recruitment (Steinert 1995: 308). To ensure that the Federal Ministry for the Interior  
pushed for an agreement rather than an exchange of notes as initially envisaged by the Foreign Office 
and the Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales) (Schönwälder 2001: 252). The agreement was concluded without decision in the German 
cabinet (Schönwälder 2001: 307). The Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs accepted 
the arguments put forward by the Foreign Office. The President of the Federal Employment Agency 
(Bundeanstalt für Arbeit), Anton Sabel, negotiated the first draft of the agreement in Turkey in summer 
1961. The agency, which is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, thus 
had a great impact on the content of the agreement. The Federal Ministry for the Economy did not 
have any significant influence on the bilateral agreement as it only received the draft agreement for 
information purposes without having the opportunity to suggest amendments (Jamin 1998: 72). 
However, the ministry had more impact in the negotiations of the revision of the agreement which 
entered into force in September 1964. 
 
The employer associations and trade unions did not take significant influence in the negotiations on 
the 1961 bilateral agreement (Schönwälder 2001: 308-309). The Bundestag did not discuss the Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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bilateral agreement either (Schönwälder 2001: 347-348). The German government was keen to keep 
the conclusion of the agreement as secret as possible to prevent other states from making claims for 
similar agreements with Germany. The Federal Ministry for Employment asserted the decision-making 
on issues of labour migration against the Federal Ministry of Economics in 1955 which was confirmed 
again in 1965 (Schönwälder 2001: 305). 
 
Turkish efforts to include the Title III were necessary for the German government to support the 
provisions. However, arguably more due to seeking equal treatment with regard to Greece than due to 
economic considerations. In addition, the bilateral agreement Germany had concluded with Turkey 
shortly before the negotiations on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement took 
place, was important to secure the German government’s support. This confirms hypothesis two and 
shows that Turkey firstly, had the opportunity to yield influence over Germany due to the close historic 
bond of the two countries and secondly, used it by exerting diplomatic pressure on Germany and 
framing of both the bilateral agreement and the Ankara Agreement as issues that might offend Turkey 
as an important NATO partner which would be very detrimental for the West due to the tense Cold War 
security situation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The  paper has derived  two multilayered hypotheses to explain why  the federal government of 
Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. 
Hypotheses one sheds light on the economic side of the argument. It shows the important role the 
Germany economy played in the preference formation of the German government. There is a positive 
relation between strong economic growth and the willingness of a government to support common EU 
measures on legal economic migration. Also, the hypothesis suggests that strong economic growth 
makes a government more inclined to have relatively open immigration policies on the national level 
and that such policies make it easier for the government to agree on common EU measures in that 
domain. The analysis of the bilateral recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey shows the 
importance of the agreement for the German position on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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Ankara Agreement. In so do doing, it also confirms the link between national immigration policies and 
European level measures. 
 
Hypotheses two complements the findings highlighted by hypotheses one in focusing on the role 
Turkey played in influencing the German position. The hypothesis consists of two main elements: first, 
the opportunity structure for Turkey to have an influence and second targeted Turkish diplomatic effort 
to use the opportunity by framing the relevant issues in an effective way. The opportunity is bestowed 
to Turkey by its important geo-political role in the security situation of the Cold War and its long-
established  friendly  relationship  with  Germany.  These  opportunities  are  used  by  the  Turkish 
government in a shrewd and successful way. Turkish motivation can be explained by the desire of 
equal treatment with Greece that concluded an association agreement with the EEC and a bilateral 
agreement with Germany shortly before Turkey did, and developmental economic considerations. This 
applies both for influencing Germany’s support for the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara 
Agreement and its willingness to conclude the bilateral labour recruitment agreement. The bilateral 
agreement plays a central part in the argument because the German government attributed greater 
importance to the regulations on the bilateral level that were more explicit and far-reaching than what 
was agreed on in the Ankara Agreement and were seen as to regulate Turkish labour migration flows 
to Germany. Hence, it was a necessary condition for the German government to support the freedom 
of movement provisions. The developments regarding the bilateral agreement and Germany’s support 
of the agreement can also be explained by hypotheses one and two. 
 
The existing literature on the Ankara Agreement (see, for instance, Gürbey 1990; Özren 1999; 
Ceylanoglu 2004; Krieger 2006) does not provide a satisfactory explanation of why the freedom of 
movement provisions are included in the Agreement and focuses to much on security political factors 
and as a result misses the complex interplay of political and economic factors that led to Germany’s 
support of the freedom of movement provisions. The paper has shown that the freedom of movement 
provisions were not just taken from the Treaty of Rome, as put forward by the literature, but are 
modified versions of the provisions in the Athens Agreement. 
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The two hypotheses developed and tested in this paper are part of a conceptual framework able to 
explain Member States’ support for common EU measures in a general way. The ability of the two 
hypotheses of not just explaining Germany’s preferences on the freedom of movement provisions but 
also on the bilateral agreement with Turkey underpins such claims of generalisability. The paper 
highlighted that in order to explain the preferences of Germany on common EU measures on legal 
economic migration, a complex array of different causal factors need to be included in the analysis. 
While economic factors lately have been prominent in attempts to explain such developments, the 
importance of sending countries’ effort has not featured in many analyses. But potentially, it is exactly 
this factor that has been missing in recent years. This will be explored in the following papers of the 
dissertation. Ankara Agreement    Matthias M. Mayer 
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